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State Durational Residence Requirements as a Violation
of the Equal Protection Clause
INTRODUCTION
As a citizen of the United States of America, one has certain funda-
mental rights--one of which is the right to vote. This right evolved
from the concept of a democratic government. The word "democracy"
is derived from two Greek words: "demos," meaning "the people," and
"karatein," meaning "to rule." Therefore democratic governments are
those which the people rule, either directly, as in small republics of ancient
Greece or indirectly, by means of representative institutions as in the
states within the United States of America. Since the United States is a
representative democracy, the most effective approach for individual
citizens to pursue in order for their ideas for improving the cities, the
states, and the nation to be implemented is to vote for persons who
espouse the same ideas for progress as the citizens.
Of course there are certain requirements that must be met before one
can vote. The first step is registering. Generally a person is eligible to
register if he is a citizen of the United States, has lived a specified time
in his voting precinct, and is deemed an adult by the laws of his state.'
However, various state constitutions and statutes have more rigid re-
quirements to be met before one can register to vote in state elections. This
was especially true in the latter part of the eighteenth century and in the
nineteenth century with the majority of states requiring property owner-
ship, payment of taxes, literacy tests in addition to citizenship, age, and
residence.2 Even though the Fourteenth Amendment as follows in per-
tinent part provides that
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male in-
habitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participa-
'U.S. News & World Report, U.S. Politics-Inside and Out 166 (1970).
'Phillips, Jewell C., State and Local Government in America 64-67 (1954).
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tion in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.a
and the Nineteenth Amendment as follows provides that
(1) The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or -by any State on
account of sex.
(2) Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation. 4
gave the right to vote to all men and women who were citizens of the
United States and who were of the requisite age, usually twenty-one, it
was not until the 1960's that this right was exercised by many citizens.
This was the result of the passage of The 1965 Civil Rights Act that
abolished the requirement of literacy tests and substituted therefor the
obligation that a person demonstrate that 'he had the equivalent of a
sixth grade education before being permitted to register.5
State residence requirements are prescribed to prevent people from
going from state to state voting in local elections and to insure familiarity
with the people and conditions in ,he state and community where an indi-
vidual seeks to vote.6 The intent of the requirements is sound, but it
presents the problem of denying transient persons the right to vote when
the residence requirement of the state into which they move is the only
requirement for voting that they fail to meet. Many cases have been and
are being adjudicated involving the denial of this fundamental right-
the right to vote. The various plaintiffs contend that they are being denied
equal protection of the law, being penalized for traveling interstate, and
being denied due process of the law. This comment is concerned with
the above mentioned contentions in addition to determining whether the
"rational relation test" or the "compelling state interest test" should be
employed to decide whether the durational state residence requirements
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
provides
'U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 2,5.
'U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
'42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c).
'Phillips, Jewell C., State and Local Government in America at 65 (1954).
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Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.7
Even though some of the cases that are going to be discussed include
the issue of the residence requirement being a requisite to vote in elec-
tions for the United States Senators and the Representatives of the House,
this aspect of the problem will not be emphasized in this writing.
THE RATIONAL RELATION TEST
When a state legislates within areas of its competence, when its legis-
lation is nondiscriminatory on its face and as applied, and when its legis-
lation does not impinge upon the federal constitutional rights of any
citizens, any classification created by the legislature survives scrutiny un-
der the Equal Protection Clause so long as the classification is "rationally
related" to promoting a legitimate state interest and is reasonable. This
general standard for reviewing state legislation challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause is known as the "rational relation test" as
articulated in McGowan v. Maryland.' Although no precise formula has
been developed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Four-
teenth Amendment permits the states a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it.9 The following discussion of cases will
emphasize the application of the "rational relation test" in chosing who
will 'be granted the franchise in the various states.
Andrews v. Cody,"0 Cocanower v. Marston," and Howe v. Brown, 2
"U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.8 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961).
'Howe v. Brown, 319 F.S. 862 (1970).
10327 F.S. 793 (1971).
11318 F.S. 402 (1970).
2'319 F.S. 862 (1970).
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are cases that involve a one year durational residence requirement in
North Carolina, Arizona and Ohio, respectively, before persons are per-
mitted to register to vote in nonpresidential elections, and plaintiffs in
Cocanower v. Marston, supra, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and
invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 28 U.S.C. § 2202, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281, 28 U.S.C. § 2284, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 and 42 U.S.C. § 1938."s
Plaintiffs in Andrews v. Cody, supra, moved to Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, nine months before seeking permission to register to vote in an
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970) under Declaratory Judgments provides
Creation of remedy. In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except
with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon filing of an ap-
propriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and shall be reviewable as such. Further relief. Further necessary or proper relief
based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice
and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such
judgment. 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1970)-Injunction against enforcement of State
statute; three-judge court required. An interlocutory or permanent injunction
restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by re-
straining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution
of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission
acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the appli-
cation therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under
section 2284 of this title which provides in pertinent part: Three-judge district;
court composition; procedure. In any action or proceeding required by Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges the com-
position and procedure of the court, except as otherwise provided by law, shall
be as follows:
... A district court of three judges shall, before final hearing, stay any action
pending therein to enjoin, suspend or restrain the enforcement or execution of a
State statute or order thereunder, whenever it appears that a State court of com-
petent jurisdiction has stayed proceedings under such statute or order pending the
determination in such State court of an action to enforce the same. If the action in
the State court is not prosecuted diligently and in good faith, the district court of
three judges may vacate its stay after hearing upon the attorney general of the
State. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970) provides Rate orders of State agencies. The district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with,
any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State ad-
ministrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the
order to the Federal Constitution; and, (2) The order does not interfere with in-
terstate commerce; and (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and
hearing; and (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides Civil Action of Deprivation of
rights. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
4
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election held in the Town of Chapel Hill and in the Chapel Hill-Carrboro
City School Administration Unit to select a mayor, an alderman, and
members of the Board of Education. Plaintiffs were also to consider a
referendum proposition and were refused permission to register because
they failed to meet the residence requirement. 4 As evidence of plaintiffs'
intent to remain in Chapel Hill are the facts that they (1) had obtained
North Carolina motor vehicle operator's licenses, (2) had registered their
car in North Carolina, (3) had filed 1970 North Carolina income tax,
(4) had listed their personal property for purposes of ad valorem taxes,
and (5) Thomas Andrews is under a three year contract of employment
with the School of Law at the University of North Carolina as Assistant
Professor of Law that expires August, 1973 and his wife is a teacher in
the local high school.
The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina con-
cluded that the one year durational residency requirement is violative of
the Equal Protection Clause even under the "reasonableness test." It
should be noted here that the State of North Carolina is not a party-
defendant to this suit. Furthermore, the factual context in which this
question has been presented involves a strictly local election. As stipulated
by the parties to this action, the only issue concerns the validity of North
Carolina's residency requirement for voting as it relates to a local election
such as that held in Chapel Hill on May 4, 1971. In this situation the
"one year in the state" requirement has to be viewed in relation with the
"thirty days in the election district" requirement. In a local election the
primary concern is whether or not the registrant is a resident of the local
election district. No reason was advanced to bring the one year require-
" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-55-Qualifications to vote; exclusion from electoral
franchise. Every person born in the United States, and every person who has
been naturalized, and who shall have resided in the State of North Carolina for one
year and in the precinct in which he offers to register and vote for thirty days next
preceding the ensuing election shall, if otherwise qualified as prescribed in this
Chapter, be qualified to register and vote in the precinct in which he resides: Pro-
vided, that removal from one precinct to another in this State shall not operate to
deprive any person of the right to vote in the precinct from which he has removed
until 30 days after his removal....
Const. of N.C. Art. VI, § 2(1)-Qualifications of voter: (1) Residence period
for State elections. Any person who has resided in the State of North Carolina
for one year and in the precinct, ward, or other election district for 30 days next
preceding an election, and possesses the other qualifications set out in this Article,
shall be entitled to vote in any election held in this State. Removal from one pre-
cinct, ward, or election district to another in this State shall not operate to deprive
any person of the right to vote in the precinct, ward, or other election district from
which that person has removed until 30 days after removal.
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ment within the "reasonableness test"; therefore, the Constitution and
statute of North Carolina are void relative to that provision. 5
Arizona's state statute16 and constitution 17 also have the one-year
durational residence requirement and plaintiff attacks the constitutionality
of the requirement for voting in state general elections. Specifically, it is
alleged that Arizona is neither promoting a compelling state interest nor
maintaining a reasonable classification by imposing the precondition of
one year residence on exercise of franchise. Likewise, because it also
prevents her from voting for candidates for the offices of United States
Senator and United States Representative of the House, plaintiff also
argues that the requirement is violative of both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and that her civil right
to travel is abridged. It can be asserted that in the context of a constitu-
tional right to travel the Court recognized a distinction between state-
imposed residency requirement as a condition to receiving welfare benefits
and those durational residency requirements imposed as a qualification
to vote. The language of the Court in Shapiro v. United States8 in-
volving the rights of welfare recipients in Pennsylvania, Connecticut and
the District of Columbia is
* . . appellants in these cases do not use and have no need to use the
one-year requirement for the governmental purposes suggested-as
safeguard against fraudulant receipt of benefits, a means of encouraging
new residents to join the labor force promptly, an administratively ef-
ficient rule of thumb for determining residency, facilitates budget pre-
dictability, planning purposes. Thus, even under traditional equal
protection tests a classification of welfare applicants according to
whether they have lived in the State for one year would seem irra-
tional and unconstitutional. But, of course, the traditional criteria do
not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the
fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be
judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling
state interest. Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement
clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court finds that this distinction is binding and accordingly cannot
find Arizona's one-year residency requirement to be an unconstitutional
18 Id.
1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-143, subsecs. A, par. 13B (Supp. 1969-70).
" Ariz. Const. Art. 7 § 2 (Supp. 1969-70).
18394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).
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penalty on the right of freedom of travel in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Nevertheless, in finding Drueding v. Delvin19 and the rationale therein
to be still binding as to state elections, the court cannot say that Arizona's
durational residency requirement violates the Due Process Clause nor
the Fifth2" and Fourteenth Amendments. The rationale in Drueding v.
Delvin, supra, is
Where purposes of the residency requirement were to (1) identify
the voter and protect against fraud and (2) insure that the voter
would in fact become a member of the community and as such have a
legitimate interest in its government, the Court could not find that
the one-year residency requirement amounted to an irrational or un-
reasonable discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The sole issue in Howe v. Brown21 is whether the additional require-
ments of the Ohio Revised Code (Page's ed., 1969 Supp.) § 2012-re-
quirements which prohibit some district residents who are otherwise
qualified by age and citizenship from participating in district meetings
and school board elections-violate the Fourteenth Amendment's com-
mand that no State shall deny persons equal protection of the laws.
Plaintiff contends that the requirement deprives him of equal protection
of the law and that it impinges upon his constitutional right to move freely
interstate.
The Nineteenth Amendment was thought necessary for reasons pre-
cisely relevant now: nothing in the Constitution or any of its Amend-
ments could be construed to confer the right to vote in state elections on
anyone.2 2 Until the Constitution is amended or until the United States
Supreme Court construes its own precedent otherwise, this court cannot
hold that the Equal Protection Clause empowers the federal courts to
strike down reasonable conditions of suffrage (i.e., age, citizenship, and
residency requirements) enacted by duly-colnstituted state legislatures for
10380 U.S. 125 (1964).
U.S. Const. amend. V provides: No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.21319 F.S. 862 (1970).22See Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627 (1874).
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legitimate state purposes, or empowers this federal court to give persons
who have lived in Ohio for less than one year the right to vote in state
elections.
2 3
As far as impinging on plaintiff's right to freely travel interstate,
there is no allegation whatever that the one-year residency requirement is
intended to or has the effect of, "fencing out" anyone from the State of
Ohio. The Court cannot hold, without clear proof to the contrary, that
anyone having the intention of moving to Ohio and living there in-
definitely is inhibited by the fact that he would not be granted the franchise
until he had lived in the State for a year. Therefore, it cannot be found
that the requirement impinges upon the constitutional right to move freely
interstate and the Court holds that the "compelling state interest test" is
not applicable.
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST
The "compelling state interest test" has two branches-(1) that
branch which requires classifications based upon "suspect" criteria such
as race and wealth, to be supported 'by a compelling state interest and
(2) that 'branch which requires statutory classifications affecting a funda-
mental right to be supported by a compelling interest regardless of the
basis of the classification.24
Affeldt v. Whitcomb25 is a class action brought by plaintiffs challeng-
ing the constitutionality of Indiana's six-month durational residence re-
quirement for voting. The class action was based on Rule 23 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of all the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.20
'
3 See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
"Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F.S. at 75 (1970). There is a common element
present in all cases applying the "compelling state interest" test which makes it
clear here that the classification was created by the state for the purpose of, or
with the effect of "fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population be-
cause of the way they might vote. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94; 85
S.Ct. 775, 779; 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965).26319 F.S. 69 (1970).
2' Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 (a) (1971 ed.).
8
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Plaintiffs define the class they seek to represent as "those residents of the
State of Indiana who will have lived in the State for less than six months
on the day of the next following general or city election." Plaintiffs, Don
and Cordall, moved to Valparaiso, Indiana on May 29, 1970, to work under
contracts of employment executed in April, 1970. Don went to the Elec-
tion Board September 18, 1970 and requested permission to register to
vote in the coming general election on November 3, 1970. He was refused
because he did not meet the six-month durational residence period required
by Ind. Stat. Ann § 29-3426 (Bums' Repl. 1969)27 and Ind. Const. art. 2,
§ 221 in order for an Indiana resident to be qualified to vote. The Porter
County Election Board held that it had no jurisdiction to review the de-
cision of the Clerk of the Circuit Court and the Board would not allow
plaintiffs to vote except under court order. Plaintiffs contend that the six-
month durational residence requirement violates their freedom to travel and
their -freedom of political association. Therefore, they seek (1) a pre-
liminary injunction requiring that the offices of all Indiana county voter
registration boards and their registration books remain open until Oc-
tober 25, 1970, or for any other reasonable period deemed appropriate to
enable plaintiffs and those in the class to register, (2) a declaratory in-
junction invalidating the six-month waiting requirement for voter regis-
tration in Indiana, and (3) a permanent injunction restraining enforce-
ment of Indiana's six-month waiting requirement. These injunctions
were sought under provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2202, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cited in footnote number
thirteen (13).
Defendants' motion to dismiss on ground that complaint failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted and that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction is denied and the court answered the question of
whether Indiana's six-month durational residence requirement for voting
in the upcoming general election as applied to interstate movers is consti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause thusly-although Indiana
27 Every person who will be at least twenty-one (21) years of age at the next
ensuing general or city election, who is a citizen of the United States, who, if
he continues to reside in the precinct until the next following general or city elec-
tion, will at that time, have resided in the state of Indiana six (6) months, in the
township, sixty (60) days and the precinct thirty (30) days, shall be entitled, upon
proper application, to be registered in such precinct.
28 In all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every citizen
of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have
resided in the State during the six months, and in the township sixty days, and in
the ward or precinct thirty days immediately preceding such election shall be
entitled to vote. ...
9
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unquestionably has the power to impose reasonable restrictions on the
availability of the ballot, that power does not encompass the imposition
of standards which are discriminatory and inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, supra. The present
action goes in the second branch of the "compelling state interest" test
since the right to vote is fundamental in that it preserves other civil and
political rights. To apply the "compelling state interest" test to this case,
one must ask (1) whether Indiana's interests underlying the six-month
durational residence requirement are compelling and (2) whether the
means chosen by Indiana to achieve those interests are necessary. In
answer to the former question, the interests include the preservation of the
purity of elections and the orderly administration of elections and pro-
motion of an "enlightened electorate." Even if these interests are com-
pelling, the means by which Indiana attempts to protect that interest
cannot be deemed "necessary" so as to satisfy the "compelling state in-
terest" test. The right to vote may not be deprived casually by Indiana to
a class merely because the deprivation will remotely benefit the admin-
istration of election procedures. The effect of the six-month require-
ment is to create two classes of residents-those who have resided in the
state for more than six months and those who have not. The class of
barred newcomers in this action is all-inclusive, that is bona fide residents
are lumped together with those who might have come to Indiana only to
vote and to work fraud on the election.
In addition, the residence requirement is really no guarantee of a
"pure" election since the qualifications of an Indiana voter are established
by oath at the time of registration which may take place up to and in-
cluding the twenty-ninth day before the election."9 A non-resident who
wants to vote can falsely swear that he is an Indiana resident, therefore
the six-month residency requirement as presently administered in Indiana
adds no real protection against dual voting. Fraud could be prevented by
other means less drastic than the denial of the right to vote due to failure
to meet the six-months' durational residence requirement. For example, a
certification from a new resident's former election district to insure that
the new voter has not retained registration in his former district may be
all that is "necessary" under the "compelling state interest" test 30 to
answer the latter question.
With regard to the state's interest in an "enlightened electorate," the
"Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-3407, 29-3412 (Burns' Supp. 1970).
"See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2cd 214 (1969).
10
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state does have a greater interest in attempting to have an electorate which
is knowledgeable of local and state issues in a general election. On the
other hand, it is not sufficient to justify the six-month requirement by an
alleged need on the part of the state to indoctrinate or impress upon
newcomers the local viewpoint. Nor is it permissible for a state to "fence
out" from the franchise a sector of the population on the basis of the way
it may vote." The very foundation of the interest itself-the assumption
that residents who have lived in the state for more than six months are
better informed about the issues and candidates in the upcoming election
than a person who has lived in the state for a shorter period of time-is
subject to criticism in light of modern communication methods. The
court sees no merit in the claim that a six-months' residence requirement
is a sine qua non32 for enlightenment of voters.
The court held that only the named plaintiffs may -register because
the election date was too close to attempt to ascertain who the would-be
voters were in Porter County particularly since no records were kept of
those who were not permitted to register the class could not be recognized.
Furthermore, Indiana's six-month durational residence requirement was
held to infringe plaintiffs' fundamental right to vote and to violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs in Lester v. Board of Elections for the District of Colum-
bia,88 in Bufford v. Holton,84 and in Kohn v. Davis"5 bring their suits
as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
supra, to challenge the constitutionality of the one-year durational res-
idence requirement of their respective states as a condition precedent to
their being permitted to vote in state elections. Th plaintiffs in Lester,
supra, are two married couples who moved to the District of Columbia in
June of 1970, purchased homes in the area, acquired car registration and
operators' permits there in addition to each husband being employed in the
Office of Budget and Executive Management of the District of Columbia
Government. Both couples are also bona fide residents of the District of
Columbia (hereinafter referred to as the District) and plan to remain
indefinitely. Plaintiffs were refused permission to register to vote in the
January 12, 1971, primary election and the March, 1971 general election
See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
82 An indispensable requisite or condition taken from Black's Law Dictionary
(Rev. 4th ed. 1968).82319 F.S. 505 (1970).
84319 F.S. 843 (1970).
88320 F.S. 246 (1970).
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for a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives on the grounds
that they will not have been residents of the District for one year con-
tinuously prior to the election as provided in the Election Law of the
District." It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the residency require-
ment creates an arbitrary classification which restricts the exercise of the
fundamental right of franchise, without a showing of a compelling govern-
mental interest in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as it is made applicable to the District through the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 7
The District Court concedes that the District may require that "all"
applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide
residents. However, it is clear that "if they are in fact residents, with the
intention of making the District their home indefinitely, they, as all other
qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political repre-
sentation."3 Though the court concluded that the "compelling state in-
terest" test is the standard to apply, it must now decide whether the District
has shown the requisite compelling state interest for a one-year durational
residence requirement. The District argues that as the seat of the na-
tional government a large portion of its population is transient, that this
election is local in nature and a certain period of time is necessary for a
voter to acquaint himself with local issues, problems and candidates and
that a one-year period is not unreasonable. Nevertheless, these arguments
are still insufficient to deprive a citizen of his only chance to participate in
the choosing of his governmental spokesman. The election is to choose
a delegate to a national body where issues local to the District are tied
up with national issues. The delegate's responsibility, among other things,
is to participate in national affairs while representing the views of all
the citizens of the District. This aspect of the election likens it to the
state election for a state representative who voices the opinions of the
citizens through his office. The court must take notice of the advancement
of mass communication which facilitates the familiarization of the issues
and candidates relevant to the election.
Therefore, the Court concludes that there has been shown no com-
pelling governmental interest in a durational residency requirement of
one year and accordingly strikes that requirement as violative of the Equal
8 1 D.C. Code § 1102(2) (a) (1967 ed., amended by Pub. L. No. 91-405, Sept.
22, 1970).See footnote 20.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. at 94 (1965).
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Protection Clause. This decision did not affect the provision prohibiting
registration thirty days prior to the election.
Plaintiffs in Bufford v. Holton, supra, were confronted with the same
problem as in Lester, supra, failure to meet the residence requirement of
one year as a prerequisite to registering in Virginia. 9 They charge Vir-
ginia with discriminatorily granting the ballot to the longer 'residents while
begrudging it to later entrants into the State without proving a reasonable
relationship between the requirement of twelve months and the right to
vote as well as a governmental interest for the distinction. Plaintiffs moved
to Virginia in January, 1970, and were refused registration to vote in the
November 3, 1970, general election for United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives. Defendants say that the privilege of a resident to vote roots
from his State citizenship, not from his United States citizenship. Further-
more, Virginia is vested by the Federal Constitution with the power to
regulate the conduct of elections for Senators and Representatives and
thus the State may frame and declare the qualifications of electors.
Plaintiffs' contentions must carry and any constriction placed by the
State on the right of suffrage must be tested against the Equal Protection
Clause, which is delicately sensitive to any actual or possible strangling
of the vote."0 The difference in treatment of residents, regardless of the
State's intendment, is clearly an arbitrary discrimination. To begin with,
this call for residence can without more be seen as an obstruction or de-
terrent to uninhibited interstate travel, admittedly a Constitutional pre-
rogative. A person might well be unduly postponed in the enjoyment of
his vote for an extortionate period, possibly as much as two years if
he came into Virginia after November in a general election year.
Again the one year stipulation loses strength through analogy. As
recent as January, 1970 the Virginia General Assembly approved the
adoption of the newly proposed State Constitution which ,provided for
six months' state residence to vote. Therefore the one year rule is con-
stitutionally impermissible. Moreover the laws of Virginia are declared
invalid and their enforcement is enjoined.
Kohn v. Davis, supra, can be distinguished from the two previously
discussed cases in that Vermont has a statute concerning the right of a
one time resident of Vermont who moved away and returned. The
statute provides that
' Code of Virginia, State Constitution Article II, §§ 18, 20 as amended (1950).
Code of Virginia §§ 24-17, 24-17.1, 24-67, 24-74, 24-75, 24-76, 24-82 and 24-83.
" See Williams v. Rhodes, 383 U.S. 23, 30; 89 S.Ct. 5; 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).
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A citizen, after removing from and residing without the state, shall
not vote at such election, until he has resided in this state one year
preceding the day of such election and taken the oath of allegiance
to the state, the oath to support the Constitution of the United States
and the freeman's oath.4 1
Plaintiff's wife was affected by the above statute because she was a native
of Vermont but moved to Rhode Island, then back to Vermont. The
court held that the one year durational residency required by Chapter II,
§ 34 of the Vt. Const. and 17 V. S.A. §§ 62-63 as a condition precedent
to the right -to vote in Vermont is an unconstitutional limitation on two
fundamental rights, the right to vote and the right to travel interstate.
Further, the standard of review applicable to the classification mandated
by these Vermont laws is that of compelling state interest. Lastly, the
court held that the burden of establishing justification by compelling
state interest is on the defendants and this burden has not 'been sustained.
Defendants' attempted justification is administrative hardship as testified
to by the Vermont Assistant Secretary of State in charge of voting pro-
cedures, when in fact, a cushion of at least ten per cent is provided for all
offices which would easily accommodate two more votes cast by plaintiffs.
Therefore the court ordered that Chapter II, § 34 of the Vermont
Constitution and 17 V.S.A. § 62-63 are unconstitutional, only in so far
as they require a one year durational residency as a condition precedent
to the right to vote in Vermont. Plaintiffs were found to be bona fide
residents of Vermont, therefore their names are to be added to the eligible
checklist for the next general election.
CONCLUSION
Th passage of The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and The Voting Rights
Act Amendment of 19704' has smoothed the path to impartial franchise.
As a result of these Acts, the citizens of the United States of America are
exercising their fundamental right to vote, as well as challenging state
statutory and constitutional provisions which they believe are hindering
them from exercising their right to vote. Even with the less rigid stip-
ulations for voting in state elections, there is still a segment of the popula-
tion which has no knowledge that it has the right to vote nor that its
vote could effectuate change in elections. (These statements are verified
by the attached charts.)
17 V.S.A. § 63.
4P.L. 91-285, Sec. 202(a), 84 Stat. 314.
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What can be done to eliminate this problem-possibly education of
the masses to their constitutional rights.
MABLE A. MINOR
Minimum Residence Requirements
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1 If less may vote in old precinct.
'If less may vote in old precinct if in same municipality.
Source: U.S. Senate, Office of the Secretary, Nomination and Election of the Pres-
ident and Vice President of the United States. U.S. Government Printing Office.
January 1968. Corrected to September 18, 1968.
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DISCRIMINATION IN SITE SELECTION
States With Best
and Worst Voting Records
(Voters as percentage of voting age population)
THE BEST
States 1968
D elaware .......................... .70.0
Idaho ............................. 72.6
Indiana ........................... 71.8
Iow a ............................. 70.8
M innesota ......................... 76.0
New Hampshire ................... 70.0
South Dakota ...................... 72.8
U tah ............................. 76.1
W ashington ....................... 71.0
THE WORST
States 1968
A labam a .......................... 50.3
District of Columbia ................ 33.5
G eorgia ........................... 42.9
M ississippi ........................ 50.6
South Carolina .................... 45.9




































Lots for Sale-Discrimination in Site Selection
Several cases in the area of low and middle income housing site selec-
tion represent the trend of today. They are Gaultraux v. Chicago Hous-
ing Authority,' Hicks v. Weaver,' El Cortez Heights Residents and
Property Owners Association v. Tucson Housing Authority,3 and Shan-
non v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Development.' There
exists a significant trend whereby the courts have (1) scrutinized the
various methods of site selection utilized by housing authorities, and
(2) strongly prohibited racial and economic discrimination in said se-
lection.
1265 F. Supp. 582 (1967), 296 F. Supp. 907 (1969), 304 F. Supp. 736 (1969).
302 F. Supp. 619 (1969).
'457 P. 294 (1969).
'436 F. 2d 809 (1970).
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